An Exploration of Conditional Clause Exegesis 379 not just a “simple present supposition” (78). Given an indefinite subject, the essentially imperfective aspect of the present tense form used here (eujaggelivzetai) need not imply a particular time reference. Rather it could be intended to have gnomic force, which would be best represented using a form such as “preaches” or “proclaims” (79), rather than “is preaching” as used in numerous contemporary translations (80). The context may suggest that this conditional clause referred obliquely to specific individuals, but the syntax alone cannot confirm this, although it allows for it. 3. Relationship of protases to apodoses Porter notes that discussion of the relationship between protases and apodoses has often centred on their temporal relationship (81). In Gal 1,8-9 the apodoses both use present imperatives which say little about timing in themselves (82). The time reference of the apodoses is controlled here by the protases, that in v. 8 being inherently futuristic and that in v. 9 being either present or future. Alternatively the protasis / apodosis relationship may be considered in terms of how they are connected logically. Nutting proposed two major categories of conditional clause: the “consequence period” and the “proviso period” (83). In the former category the concept expressed in the protasis is the logical starting point; this concept entails the concept expressed in the apodosis (84). In a “proviso period” the logical starting point is the apodosis, and the fulfilment of this is shown to be dependent on the fulfilment of the protasis (85). The conditional clauses of Gal 1,8-9 are both of the former type. Paul presents the idea of apostate preaching, and states the consequence of this. He does not start with the ajnavqema, and then outline what circumstances would need to be fulfilled for this to be actuated. Nutting divides consequence periods into three main cate- (78) BURTON, Galatians, 30. (79) See NRSV. (80) E.g. ESV, NASB, NIV. (81) PORTER, Idioms, 265. (82) Cf. PORTER, Idioms, 53. (83) H.C. NUTTING, “The Order of Conditional Thought”, AJP 24 (1903) 27-28. (84) NUTTING, “Order”, 27. (85) NUTTING, “Order”, 32.