David J. Armitage, «An Exploration of Conditional Clause Exegesis with Reference to Galatians 1,8-9», Vol. 88 (2007) 365-392
This paper explores various issues pertaining to the exegesis of Greek conditional clauses, using as a case study the pair of conditional statements found in Galatians 1,8-9. These conditional curse formulations are broadly similar with reference to content, whilst also showing significant differences, notably in terms of mood. These conditional statements are firstly examined from syntactic and semantic perspectives. Their function in the discourse is then analysed with reference to Speech Act Theory. An integrative approach to exegesis of conditional clauses is advocated.
An Exploration of Conditional Clause Exegesis 369
example the imperfective aspect of the present indicative allows it to be
used in ways which encompass a portion of the future (e.g. gnomic use).
In first class conditions, the force of the indicative is modified by
the presence of eij. This introduces a hypothetical element (17) which
pushes the indicative towards the realm of projection. Such uses of the
indicative no longer make assertions in the normal sense, but as
Wallace puts it, they “address an argument from certainty†(18). Because
what is stated is presented as part of an argument, the speaker may
quite acceptably assert something (“for the sake of argumentâ€) (19)
which neither they nor their hearers believe to be true.
The suggestion of certain grammarians that first class conditions
can be translated using “since†rather than “if†demonstrates the
perception in some quarters that the protasis of such a clause actually
corresponds to reality, or at the very least to the speaker’s beliefs about
reality. BDF suggests that first class clauses are “predominantly used
with reference to a present or alleged reality†(20) and eij is said to
“border on causal ‘since’†(21). There is no useful sense in which such a
statement could be referred to as a condition. Goodwin rightly suggests
that “the Greek has no form implying that a condition is or was
fulfilled, and it is hardly conceivable that any language should find
such a form necessary or useful†(22).
Boyer has convincingly demonstrated that in the New Testament
first class conditions vary greatly in their relationship to reality (23).
Frequently, first class conditions have protases that are clearly untrue,
and for many others the truth of the protasis is not known. Boyer
therefore proposes that first class conditions just demonstrate logical
connection; nothing is implied as to the fulfilment or the probability of
the protasis (24). Porter suggests that since all conditions imply logical
(17) See BDAG, 277.
(18) WALLACE, Grammar, 446 n. 2.
(19) See PORTER, Verbal Aspect, 294.
(20) BDF, 188.
(21) BDF, 189.
(22) GOODWIN, Syntax, §391. WALLACE, Grammar, 692, points out that the NT
writers had other words (such as ejpeiv) to express causal links, as represented by
“since†in English.
(23) J.L. BOYER, “First Class Conditions: What Do They Mean?â€, GTJ 2/1
(1981) 77. See also L.W. LEDGERWOOD III, “What does the Greek First Class
Conditional Imply? Gricean Methodology and the Testimony of the Ancient
Greek Grammariansâ€, GTJ 12/1 (1991)118-119.
(24) BOYER, “First Class Conditionsâ€, 82.