David J. Armitage, «An Exploration of Conditional Clause Exegesis with Reference to Galatians 1,8-9», Vol. 88 (2007) 365-392
This paper explores various issues pertaining to the exegesis of Greek conditional clauses, using as a case study the pair of conditional statements found in Galatians 1,8-9. These conditional curse formulations are broadly similar with reference to content, whilst also showing significant differences, notably in terms of mood. These conditional statements are firstly examined from syntactic and semantic perspectives. Their function in the discourse is then analysed with reference to Speech Act Theory. An integrative approach to exegesis of conditional clauses is advocated.
An Exploration of Conditional Clause Exegesis 383
force of ajllav is best represented using “yet†or “indeed†rather than
“butâ€, since it does not introduce a statement opposite to v. 7, but one
that stands against it in so far as it presents v. 7 as insufficient. The
contrast is with the supposition that the problem Paul identifies in v. 7
is insignificant (100).
This link can be represented using a paraphrase such as: “there are
some who are distorting the gospel of Christ…yet even if we did such
a thing, we would be worthy of the most serious punishment.†In this
way Paul stresses that the authenticity of the gospel matters very much,
and matters more than identity of the messenger. The indicative
repetition in v. 9 is then used to stress the point in language that invites
an altogether less hypothetical application.
The block of material following the twin conditional statements of
v. 8 and v. 9 is linked to it by gavr. While this may signal a logical
connection, it is often used as a narrative marker equivalent to dev (101),
with no particular causal force. The nature of the material in v. 10
suggests that rather than explaining or expanding the specific argument
of vv. 8-9, it constitutes a separate comment (emotively expressed) on
a broadly similar theme, which leads into the wider discussion initiated
in vv. 12-13.
III. A Pragmatic Approach to Conditional Clauses
1. Speech Acts and Illocutionary Force
Semantic and syntactic analyses, though vital for exegesis, are not
sufficient. A word, taken in isolation, does not have “a meaning†as
such; it merely has a semantic field defined by the range of
conventional usages in utterances (102). The same is true of a series of
syntactically linked words. Such juxtaposition further constrains the
semantic possibilities for each word, but does not firmly define their
“meaningâ€. Therefore knowing everything about the semantics of third
class conditions (for example) would not allow the “meaning†of a
particular instance to be defined. The semantics, do, however, put
limits on what the construction can conventionally be used for. The
(100) Cf. BURTON, Galatians, 25; LONGENECKER, Galatians, 16.
(101) BDAG, 189.
(102) “Utterance†is here understood to refer to a particular instance of the use
of a sentence (cf. P. COTTERELL – M. TURNER, Linguistics and Biblical
Interpretation [London 1989] 16).