386 David J. Armitage may function with multiple illocutionary forces that cut across these major divisions (117). The relationship of individual speech acts to entire discourses is complex. When speech acts are juxtaposed in a particular context they will each affect what felicity conditions apply to the neighbouring utterances. As Schiffrin points out, when one speech act expands upon another, the illocutionary force of the second is inextricably bound up with that of the first (118). For this reason, it may be that units larger than sentences function as illocutionary acts (119). Since speech acts interact in this way, analysis of real (as opposed to hypothetical) examples inevitably leads to analysis of discourses (120). Indirect speech acts are used for two major reasons (121). Firstly, people tend not to duplicate, in their words, information already available from the context (122). Secondly, direct performatives can be perceived as very harsh, and are therefore often inappropriate. Politeness frequently requires that statements be made in a less direct fashion (123). This may be influenced by the relative social position of the individuals involved (124). Peccei points out that the use of indirect speech acts provides the hearer with an easy escape route if they do not wish to comply with what has been said. They may also function as a subtle expression of mutual solidarity (125); the use of an indirect speech act tacitly acknowledges that certain presuppositions are shared. In relation to conditional statements Nutting points out how sometimes “the use of the conditional particle gives the impression of virtuous self-depreciation” (126). Young suggests that all conditional statements should be “seen as implicit performatives which are used to do something in addition to stating a condition” (127). “Stating a condition” is itself a representative (117) SCHIFFRIN, Discourse, 63-76, gives an example of an utterance which, based on its surface structure, is an assertion, but which can be understood as a question, a request (directive) or an offer (commissive). (118) SCHIFFRIN, Discourse, 78. (119) SCHIFFRIN, Discourse, 81. (120) SCHIFFRIN, Discourse, 49. (121) See YOUNG, “Classification”, 34. (122) One of the key elements allowing effective communication, proposed by Grice, is the convention that utterances are as informative as required, but not more informative than necessary (noted in SCHIFFRIN, Discourse, 194). (123) PECCEI, Pragmatics, 62. (124) YOUNG, “Classification”, 34. (125) PECCEI, Pragmatics, 64. (126) NUTTING, “Modes”, 282. (127) YOUNG, “Classification”, 40.