Reading Social Conflict through Greek Grammar 111 that require attention. The first involves the reality of Christian suffering. Over the years, commentators have debated the meaning (and function) of the fourth-class condition in 1 Pet 3,14a (and 3,17). At issue has been the degree of probability—high or low—communicated by the form and how it is to be interpreted in connection with the readers’ suffering. As mentioned above, during the early-20th century it was the assumption of many interpreters that the fourth-class condition indicated a future contingency with a possible or, in many cases, only a remote chance of fulfillment. In order to reconcile this assertion with the descriptions of suffering found later in the epistle (e.g., 1 Pet 4,12-19; 5,9), a composite document was commonly envisaged4. What is significant about these partition approaches is that, despite being abandoned by modern scholarship, they continue to set the agenda within Petrine studies. This is evident in the fact that the fourth-class condition continues to be approached through the same process of inquiry that has been employed for many decades. The question that most interpreters tend to pose of this construction is whether it contradicts the (assumed) reality of the readers’ present suffering5. When assessing the degree of probability represented by the form, scholastic views have thus spanned the entirety of the potentiality spectrum. There have been some interpreters who, because of what appears to be clear evidence of suffering elsewhere in the epistle, have placed a much greater emphasis on the likelihood of the condition’s fulfillment6. On the very opposite 4 This type of partition approach, which was first introduced by J.H.A. Hart (The First Epistle General of Peter [The Expositor’s Greek Testament 5; London 1910] 3-4), and later popularized in the work of E.R. Perdelwitz (Die Mysterienreligion und das Problem des I. Petrusbriefes. Ein literarischer und religionsgeschichtlicher Versuch [RVV 11/3; Giessen 1911] 12-16), became very common in the early-twentieth century (so, e.g., H. Windisch, Die Katholischen Briefe [2nd ed.; HNT 15; Tübingen 1930] 82; J.W.C. Wand, The General Epistles of St. Peter and St. Jude [WC; London 1934] 1-3; C.F.D. Moule, “The Nature and Purpose of I Peter”, NTS 3 [1956-57] 1-11; F. Hauck, Die Briefe des Jakobus, Petrus, Judas und Johannes [NTD 10; Göttingen 1957] 36; J. Schneider, Die Briefe des Jakobus, Petrus, Judas und Johannes: Die Katholischen Briefe [9th ed.; Göttingen 1961] 41; A.R.C. Leaney, The Letters of Peter and Jude: A Commentary on the First Letter of Peter, a Letter of Jude and the Second Letter of Peter [CBC; Cambridge 1967] 8; F.W. Beare, The First Epistle of Peter: The Greek Text with Introduction and Notes [3rd ed.; Oxford 1970] 25-28; et al). 5 Even recent commentators still feel compelled to defend the reality of suffering in this verse (so, e.g., P.J. Achtemeier, 1 Peter: A Commentary on First Peter [Hermeneia; Minneapolis 1996] 230; D.P. Senior, 1 Peter [SP 15; Collegeville, MN 2003] 94; T.R. Schreiner, 1, 2, Peter, Jude [NAC; Nashville 2003] 171). 6 Based on the consideration that “the phrase εἰ καί (“even if”) can describe a condition either already fulfilled or most likely to be,” Achtemeier argues that, “the optative πάσχοιτε (“you suffer”) has an implication here other than remote potentiality” (1 Peter, 230). He suggests, instead, that the optative is employed to describe a “sporadic reality” (231; emphasis added). In support of his thesis that εἰ καί can denote either a condition that has