T.B. Williams, «Reading Social Conflict through Greek Grammar: Reconciling the Difficulties of the Fourth-Class Condition in 1 Pet 3,14.», Vol. 26 (2013) 109-126
For the most part, it is assumed that in the Koine period the fourth-class condition indicated a future contingency with a possible or, in many cases, only a remote chance of fulfillment (e.g., “if this could happen”). If this meaning is applied to the condition in 1 Pet 3,14, it seems to imply not the reality of suffering, but merely the remote possibility, which is at odds with the popular understanding of the epistle’s social situation. This study is an attempt to examine the meaning of the fourth-class condition in 1 Pet 3,14 and its function(s) within the larger Petrine argument, a task which not only sheds light on the interpretation of 1 Pet 3,13-17, but also provides the unity of the epistle with some much-needed substantiation.
Reading Social Conflict through Greek Grammar 117
latter being a less probable, future contingency). After noting the absence
of any complete fourth-class conditions in the NT, he argues, “if all future
conditions in the NT are third class, that is, all are more probable, there
is no longer any meaning to ‘more’”22.
It is this dramatic shift that has caused Boyer to question the validity
of a distinction between moods in conditional sentences. The real
problem, in his mind, is that the degree of potentiality covered by the
third-class condition spans the entirety of the spectrum from certainty
to impossibility. That is, it covers not only its customary functions from
the classical period but also the tasks once performed by the fourth-class
condition. Consequently, he would say, “degree of potentiality is a factor
within all moods, but it is not a distinguishing factor between the moods
. . . The mood used does not in any sense indicate how confident one can
be that something will or will not happen”23.
Such concerns are certainly warranted considering the wholesale
transfer many have made when moving from classical to Hellenistic
Greek. Conditional sentences in the NT are often approached without
the realization that the subjunctive had, for the most part, taken over the
duties of the optative. Nevertheless, Boyer swings the pendulum too far
in the opposite direction when he rules out any applicable carryover into
the NT. In essence, any significance brought about by the presence of the
optative (even though it may only be in either the protasis or apodosis)
is removed. As a result, it attributes little to no value to a consciously
selected form24.
It is true that there was overlap between moods. Distinction between
moods, therefore, might not be as hard and fast as once believed. However,
what must be taken into account is that this overlap took place in only
one direction—the subjunctive encroached upon the optative. Since the
optative was on the decline, its employment would signal a definite shift
from what would have been communicated by a more elastic form. This
is due to the fact that encroachment upon the duties of a form does not
in any way annul the form’s meaning when it is employed25. In fact,
the exact opposite would seem to be the case since the usage becomes
more pronounced. The aspect of the optative (and thus the fourth-class
condition) that would likely be most pronounced is that which set it
22
J.L. Boyer, “Third (and Fourth) Class Conditions”, Grace Theological Journal 3
(1982) 171 (original emphasis).
23
idem, “The Classification of Optatives: A Statistical Study”, Grace Theological
Journal 9 (1988) 138 (original emphasis).
24
See the critique by Wallace, Exegetical Syntax, 700 n. 40.
25
Ibid., 700.