T.B. Williams, «Reading Social Conflict through Greek Grammar: Reconciling the Difficulties of the Fourth-Class Condition in 1 Pet 3,14.», Vol. 26 (2013) 109-126
For the most part, it is assumed that in the Koine period the fourth-class condition indicated a future contingency with a possible or, in many cases, only a remote chance of fulfillment (e.g., “if this could happen”). If this meaning is applied to the condition in 1 Pet 3,14, it seems to imply not the reality of suffering, but merely the remote possibility, which is at odds with the popular understanding of the epistle’s social situation. This study is an attempt to examine the meaning of the fourth-class condition in 1 Pet 3,14 and its function(s) within the larger Petrine argument, a task which not only sheds light on the interpretation of 1 Pet 3,13-17, but also provides the unity of the epistle with some much-needed substantiation.
Reading Social Conflict through Greek Grammar 113
to give commentators problems. What far too few have recognized is that
the present verse is concerned with the possibility of righteous suffering,
not suffering in general, and, therefore, it cannot be used as evidence
from which to determine the reality of persecution.
Second, in many recent treatments of this passage, there has been
some confusion between the semantics of the fourth-class condition and
its larger contextual function. The treatment found in the monumental
work of William J. Dalton serves as a prime example of how the two are
often spoken of interchangeably with the result that the former is never
actually established. Dalton begins by denying that the form conveys a
sense of remote potentiality: “It is not at all necessary to interpret the
use of the optative in these verses as indicating that suffering is merely
possible [i.e., a statement about the condition’s semantics]”. Instead, he
says, “Given the general tone of the whole letter, it is much more likely
that the optative seeks to spare the feelings of his readers rather than
dismay them with too blunt a reference to the painful trail of persecution
[i.e., a statement about the condition’s function]”10. Thus, after he denies
one possible meaning of the form, he never suggests another as its
replacement. By offering an explanation of the condition’s overall function
within the larger Petrine argument, he assumes that its meaning has been
resolved as well. Instead, what he has done is simply leave the question
of semantics unanswered. A more fruitful approach would begin by first
establishing the range of meaning normally conveyed by the form via its
use in comparative literature. Then, once the normative boundaries have
been set, one should seek out the most appropriate option in the given
context. After resolving the question of semantics, then and only then,
can its function be explored.
A final problem with many of the previous treatments is that
commentators have attempted to explain the meaning of the optative by
way of the audience’s situation (as constructed from the letter as a whole)
10
W.J. Dalton, Christ’s Proclamation to the Spirits: A Study of 1 Peter 3:18-4:6 (2nd ed.;
AnBib 23; Rome 1989) 73. A point that Dalton (and many others who espouse the same
view) has failed to consider is that in order to function as a tactful way of preventing further
grief for the readers, the condition must necessarily denote an unlikely future contingency,
the very meaning that Dalton (and others) deny. To this we might compare the treatment of
the optative by Boring. After ruling out a particular semantic meaning (“This grammatical
construction does not connote a remote future possibility”), Boring discusses the reality
of the readers’ suffering and then proposes a specific function of the condition, “It is this
real but sporadic nature of the persecution that is indicated by the optative mood” (1 Peter,
131). But, similar to Dalton, what Boring has overlooked is that in order to represent the
sporadic nature or the unpredictability of persecution, the condition must convey some
sense of uncertainty.