102 Terrance Callan false teachers will be corrupted in the corruption of the irrational animals (ejn th'/ fqora/' aujtw'n kai; fqarhvsontai). In Greek lovgo" means both reason and speech; the latter is an outward expression of the former (2). The idea that humans are distinguished from other animals in that humans reason and speak (i.e., are logikoiv) while other animals do not goes back at least to Aristotle (see e.g. De Anima 433A; Nicomachean Ethics 1111B) and was strongly affirmed by the Stoics (see e.g., Epictetus 1.2.1). Others, especially Platonists, rejected the distinction (3). For example, in the dialogue De Animalibus 10-71 Philo of Alexandria’s nephew Alexander presents an extensive argument that animals are rational(4). Likewise, Plutarch argues that animals are rational in De sollertia animalium (Moralia 959-985) and Bruta animalia ratione uti (Moralia 985- 992) (5). Some such arguments acknowledge that animals do not speak as humans do, but maintain that animals do reason. Thus the Greek title of Plutarch, Bruta animalia ratione uti – Peri; tou' ta; a[loga lovgw/ crh'sqai - designates animals as a[loga even as it proposes that animals use lovgo" (cf. also 992C)(6). Other arguments that animals are rational maintain that at least some animals speak. Thus Alexander in Philo, De Animalibus 13-15 argues that birds are capable of rational utterance, and Plutarch, De sollertia animalium argues that starlings, crows and parrots are endowed with rational utterance (proforiko;" lovgo") (972F-973E). The idea that animals are irrational is not found in the Hebrew bible, but was taken up by Hellenistic Jews. For example, in De Animalibus 77-100 Philo rejects his nephew Alexander’s argument that animals are rational. Likewise, Wis 11,15-16 says that God punished the Egyptians’ worship of irrational serpents and worthless animals by means of irrational animals so they might learn that one is punished by the very things by which one sins. There are many other references to irrational animals in Hellenistic Jewish literature (7). It is presumably from here that Jude has derived the idea that animals are irrational, and 2 Peter has derived it from Jude. (2) On the relationship between reason and speech see R. SORABJI, Animal Minds and Human Morals. The Origins of the Western Debate (Ithaca, NY 1993) 80-86. U. Dierauer says that in its earliest use, the designation of animals as a[loga meant that they lacked speech (U. DIERAUER, Tier und Mensch im Denken der Antike. Studien zur Tierpsychologie, Anthropologie und Ethik [Amsterdam 1977] 33). (3) For detailed discussion of the dispute and its ramifications, see SORABJI, Animal Minds; cf. also R.M. GRANT, Early Christians and Animals (London & New York 1999) 9-11. (4) For this treatise see A. TERIAN, Philonis Alexandrini De Animalibus. The Armenian Text with an Introduction, Translation and Commentary (Chico, CA 1981). The text and translation of Philo’s other writings are taken from the LCL, as are the text and translation of other Greek and Latin writers cited in this essay as far as possible. (5) The view that animals are rational can easily be seen to imply that one should abstain from eating animal flesh. Plutarch makes such an argument in De esu carnium orationes I and II (Moralia 993A-999B) as does Porphyry in On Abstinence from Animal Food. (6) Animals are also called a[loga in the Greek title of Philo, De Animalibus. They are also said to have lovgo" in Plutarch, Bruta animalia ratione uti 991F, 992D-E. (7) See 4 Macc 14,14, 18; Philo, Post. 161; Abr. 266-7; Mos. 1.272; Spec. Leg. 1.148; 2.69; 4.121; Virt. 81, 117, 125, 133, 140, 148, 160; Josephus Ap. 2.213; Ant. 10.262.