106 Terrance Callan donkey; the LXX uses o[no" as does Josephus (see Ant. 4.109-110). However, Josephus speaks of the donkey as having a fwnh;n ajnqrwpivnhn; these are very close to the words used by 2 Peter and are not found in the biblical text. Philo uses uJpozuvgion in reference to Balaam’s donkey (Mos. 1.169). When Philo treats the words of the donkey as a rebuke spoken by various life pursuits in Cher. 35, they rebuke the person as proud-necked. 2 Peter’s point is that the donkey acted more righteously than did Balaam; Balaam was inferior to the donkey in this respect, as are the false teachers who follow Balaam. We have noted above that Philo refers to Balaam’s donkey as an irrational animal. The story of Balaam is an instance of an irrational animal’s being superior to the false teachers. They are not like this particular irrational animal, but are inferior to it. The author of 2 Peter describes the donkey as voiceless. This probably does not mean that the donkey is incapable of making a sound, but rather that it is incapable of speech. As we have noted above, in Greek thought speech and rationality were closely related. Thus, in On Abstinence from Animal Food 3.3, Porphyry says that voice (fwnhv) is external reason (proforiko;" lovgo"). The description of the donkey as voiceless may be intended to indicate that it was irrational (16). 3. Like a dog and a sow (2 Pet 2,22) 2 Peter 2,22 is one of the author’s additions to the material he adapted from Jude. It is the culmination of his critique of the false teachers and of his comparison of them to animals. The author says concerning the followers of the false teachers and the false teachers themselves that the meaning of the true proverb has applied to them: a dog having turned back to his own vomit, and a sow, having been washed, to wallowing in the mud (sumbevbhken aujtoi'" to; th'" ajlhqou'" paroimiva", Kuvwn ejpistrevya" ejpi; to; i[dion ejxevrama, kaiv, »U" lousamevnh eij" kulismo;n borbovrou). The first part of the proverb comes from the bible, specifically from Prov 26,11; the second part apparently comes from The Story of Ahikar 8.15/18. Neither source is cited verbatim; Bauckham thinks the two may have been combined by Hellenistic Jews before 2 Peter used the combination (17). One thing suggesting this is that the author refers to this as a single proverb although it has two distinct parts. Dogs and pigs are among the specific animals described as irrational with which humans are compared in the passages discussed above in connection with 2 Peter 2,12. Dogs are the irrational animals with which humans are compared with respect to good qualities in Philo, Post. 161; Abr. 266-267; Spec. Leg. 4.121; and Plutarch, De amore prolis 493C. Pigs are the irrational animals with which humans are compared with respect to bad qualities in (16) In the passage cited Porphyry is arguing that since animals have voices, they are therefore rational. He specifically mentions canine and bovine speech alongside barbarian and Greek. As was noted above, a similar argument is found in Philo, De Animalibus and Plutarch, De sollertia animalium. In Politics 1253A Aristotle separates voice and reason. He says that animals have voice (fwnhv) but not speech (lovgo") that manifests reason. (17) BAUCKHAM, Jude, 2 Peter, 273.