336 Paul Heger here scholars who argue that this is the outcome of a completely different Weltanschauung” (54), and disagree with those scholars who maintain that it is the outcome of logical considerations (55). The goring ox rules in Exodus are very similar in many aspects to the Mesopotamian parallels, and their connection is “virtually certain” (56). It would thus be extremely difficult to assume that the exceptional insertion of the manner of the ox’s disposal should have been added to the Israelite law without any specific motive and intention; its unique elements were added to adapt the law to Israelite theology. The ox has “has objectively committed a de facto insurrection against the hierarchic order established by the Creation” (57), and must be eliminated from the world. The negligent owner of the goring ox pays an indemnity to the family of the person killed, to expiate his failure; but the next-of-kin of the person killed by the ordinary ox are left without any composition for their loss, since the owner has not performed any sin against God. Payment to the next-of-kin might have been perceived, in the case of the goring ox, as compensation for the loss of life, and that had to be avoided. Similarly, the family of the unintentionally killed person could not receive compensation. Israelite law, at least with respect to loss of human life, is primarily concerned with the action of the perpetrator, not the loss of the affected party. In the Mesopotamian rules, in contrast, not only is composition the primary focus, it may also vary according to the status of the injured party. This is the case for both death and injury, as well as affecting remuneration for services performed. The penalty for negligent construction causing death, for instance, varied in LH 229- 231 according to whether the deceased was the property owner (the builder is killed), the owner’s son (the builder’s son is killed), or the owner ’s slave (the builder must provide a slave of equal value). As to injury, if a man hit a pregnant awilu woman and caused a miscarriage, he paid ten shekels (LH 209); but if she were a commoner, the amount was five shekels (LH 211), and for the fetus of a slave woman he paid two shekels (LH 213). As a final example, the physician’s remuner- (54) See, e.g. M. MALUL, The Comparative Method in Ancient Near East and Biblical Legal Studies (Neukirchen 1990) 132-135; and J.J. FINKELSTEIN, “The Ox that Gored”, TAPhS 71 (1981) 28. (55) HOUTMAN, Exodus, 174-176 records their different conjectures. See also JACKSON, Essays, 108-152 for a lengthy discussion of this peculiar rule. (56) R. YARON, The Laws of Eshnunna, (Jerusalem – Leiden 21988) 293. (57) J.J. FINKELSTEIN, “Ox”, 28.