Source of Law in the Biblical 335 apply to a Hebrew slave, because Scripture explicitly adds the justification: awh wpsk yk “since he is his property”. This rationalization stresses the fact that the slave is his master’s property, justifying the exception to the general rule. This justification cannot apply to a Hebrew slave. His body and life are not his master’s property; he has only sold his services for a limited period of a maximum of six years (Exod 21,2). In the rules of Lev 25,40, his particular status as bçwtk rykçk is explicitly stated, and this is again emphasized in the calculation of his redemption in Exod 25,53. Exod 21,20-21 thus unequivocally refers only to an alien slave. In fact, the difference in status between the gentile and Israelite slave is founded on a theological basis, justified by the divine declaration: “For the Israelites belong to me as servants” (Exod 25,55). Furthermore, the release from capital punishment is not a disregard of the value of human life, since it does not apply in the event the slave dies on the spot from the owner’s actions. If he dies later, his death is not perceived as an unequivocal killing. I speculate that the alien slave had a hybrid status between a full-fledged human, who enjoys all the rights and obligations of a member of society, and a slave, who is already born with drastically restricted human rights, as we read in Lev 25,46. For a society that accepts or perhaps even creates such a hybrid and lower status the divine order is therefore disrupted differently, in minor measure, by the loss of the life of a slave. Alternatively, the slave’s death cannot be traced directly to his master’s blows, since he has a right to beat him (53). ii. Punishing the Perpetrator versus Compensating the Victim Another significant philosophical difference between the cuneiform and the Israelite laws regards the taking of life. In cuneiform laws, the primary intent is to redress the damage done to the wronged party. In Israelite law, God is the affected party, and the restoration of the divine order takes priority over the interests of the wronged human party. This reversal triggers another consequence: the emphasis on redressing the damage done, the objective of the cuneiform law, is shifted in biblical law to the obliteration of the perpetrator ’s sin. This is attained by his death for premeditated murder. The stoning of an ox that killed a person and the prohibition against eating its flesh constitute a unique rule in Israelite legislation. I follow (53) As suggested by D. DAUBE, “Direct and Indirect Causation in Biblical Law”, VT 11 (1961) 246-269.