416 Peter Frick of the same thing’ (195a). Specifically, Aristotle proposed that there are four distinct causes (194b). These causes are classified and typically known to us by their scholastic names as causa formalis, causa materialis, causa efficiens and causa finalis. In the Aristotelian categorization, the formal cause is that which is archetypical, that which indicates the essence or genus of the cause; in other words, the most basic or primary aspect of a cause or nexus of causes. The material cause is that out of which or with which (the actual material) something is caused; in Aristotle’s words, the bronze of the statue or the silver of a bowl. The efficient cause is described by Aristotle as the primary source for change, for example, the role of a parent in rearing a child. Lastly, the final cause is that ‘for the sake of which’ something is ultimately done, as for example, walking is done for health. 2. The Distinction of Causes in Philo of Alexandria Philo of Alexandria is crucial in our attempt to demonstrate that the distinction of causes was actually employed in the context of Jewish biblical exegesis. The Alexandrian employed a distinction of four causes in his explanation of the origin of creation (4). There is not enough evidence to suggest that Philo takes this distinction directly from Aristotle; more likely, he employed a distinction of causes that was part of the Middle-Platonic and Stoic doxographic traditions both of which had already adapted the Aristotelian categorization of causes for their own philosophic interests (5). For our purposes, the question of the precise origin of the idea is not as important as the fact that Philo did employ such a distinction in his explanation of the origin of creation. In the passage De Cherubim 125 (6), Philo explains the four causes of creation on the basis of a word play with four Greek prepositions: For to bring anything into being needs all these [causes] conjointly, the ‘by which’ (to; uJf∆ ou|), the ‘from which’ (to; ejx ou|), the ‘through which’ (to; uJf∆ ou|), the ‘for which’ (to; di∆ ou|), and the first of these is the cause (ai[tion), the second the material (u{lh), the third the tool or instrument (ejrgalei'on) (7), and the fourth the end or object (aijtiva) (8). (4) The following is based on my Divine Providence in Philo of Alexandria (TSAJ 77; Tübingen 1999) 109-110. (5) Aristotle himself does not make a formal association between his understanding of causes and the prepositional schema as it was developed in later philosophic discussions. His fourfold categorization of the causes was taken up and modified by Platonic and Stoic traditions. Seneca knows of five and Basil of Alexandria knows of six causes. (6) The Greek text and a German translation are printed in BALTES, Die philosophische Lehre des Platonismus, IV, 130-131; for a commentary, see IV, 409-413. The following text is that of the Loeb Classical Library. (7) Philo’s usual term for instrument is o[rganon. (8) Philo discusses the notion of causes in two more texts. In Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesim 1,58, he provides an allegorical exegesis of Gen 4,1, the verse in which Eve exclaims after she gave birth to Cain: “I have acquired a man through God”. Philo now gives the following interpretation. He explains that: “a distinction is made between ‘by someone’ or ‘from someone’ and ‘through something’ or ‘from something’, that is, from matter. ‘Through someone’ means through a cause, and ‘through something’” means through an instrument. But the father and creator of the universe is not an instrument but a cause”. In the second text, De Providentia 1,23, Philo once more speaks of the four causes