91 Ἔνοχος (Mt 5, 21-22) and the Jurisprudence of Heaven his agent, go forth and kill so-and-so, the agent is liable, and his principal is free, but Shammai the Elder said the principal is liable by the laws of Heaven (ayyāv bedînê šāmāyim)11. It is said that this is “moral liability” but that term is insufficiently dramatic. Then there is b. Gi. 53a (cf. b. B.Q. 56a): “If one does work with the heifer of purification he is exempt before the earthly court but liable before the heavenly court”12. At b. B.Q. 55b we have a convenient summary (not exhaustive); “an offender is exempt... but liable to the judgement of Heaven (as at B.Q, 28b- 29a) in four typical cases: (1) breaking a fence in front of a neighbour’s animal; (2) bending down a neighbour’s standing corn in front of a fire; (3) hiring false witnesses to give evidence; and (4) knowing of evidence favourable to X; and failing to testify on his behalf”13. This jurisprudence has nothing to do with the End Time: it runs concurrently with the limping human jurisprudence. It is therefore of interest to students of comparative jurisprudence and legal history. The pentateuchal basis is Dt 12,28; 13,19(18): “When thou doest that which is good and right... to do that which is right in the eyes of the Lord thy God”14. Of unusual interest is b. B.Q. 56a, where there is a great discussion about the Jurisprudence of Heaven. Subject to certain qualifications a convict might be declared innocent by Heaven’s court (a calamity sought to be avoided at Mt 16,19; 18,18-19). The model instances of “heavenly” guilt appear not only in the Mishna but also in the Tosefta, which gives them a greater age than those in the Talmuds15. So even Talmudic passages go back to the time when the Temple still sood -or at the least their theory does. The incompetence and unpredictability of human laws and their implementation were known in the time of Christ16. The idea that there are (not will be) standards which apply in a superior court with every means of coercion and from which there is no appeal must have been a valuable idea. If one ayyāv one could hardly escape save by contrition such as Hezekiah’s (2 Kgs 20,3-6). The results might be invisible, but that could not be assumed: hell is the punishment which is only in a sense postponed, for Gêhînom17 was inexorable and cast its shadow before it. Falk, Introduction 29-30; SB I, 273-4; Bonsirven, Textes §1569. 11 SB I, 275. 12 The four examples do appear also at Jerusalem Talmud B.Q. 5b and Tosefta Šev III.1. 13 Bonsirven, Textes §§ 1626, 1970. Items (2) and (3) appear at § 1970. R. Ishmael (c. 130 AD) at Sifre on Deuteronomy §§79, 96, trans. R. Hammer (New 14 Haven & London 1986) 134, 144. Tos. B.Q. VI. 16-17 (Falk, Introduction 30); Šev III. 1-3 (ibid., Bonsirven, Textes 15 §§1969-70); Sanh. XIII.5, XIV.16 (Bonsirven § 1931). J.D.M. Derrett, “Law and administration in the New Testament world”, in J. Barton, 16 ed., The Biblical Worid (London & New York 2002) II, 75-89. See below nn. 20-21. 17