98 Sebastian Fuhrmann where wisdom is marked as an ajgaqovn. Philo is, however, not the only authority for this use of the concept. Lucian, Tox 41, for instance, uses it in a quite similar way: Toxaris speaks of Dandamis, who gave his eyes as a ransom for his friend, who had been captured by a victorious enemy, and sums up: It seemed that our enemies did not take away the most precious of our goods from us (to; megiston hJmi'n twn agaqwn), rather were the noble v 'j ' sentiment and the loyalty to our friends still with us (ajll∆ eti hn par∆ [ | hJmi'n hJ agaqh; gnwmh kai; hJ pro" tou" filou" pisti") (18). j v ; ; v v The examples of Philo and Lucian provide some insight into a possible understanding of the genitive in Hebr 9,11a: Philo understands the ajgaqav as realised on a person, and in a conspicuously similar manner to Hebr 9,11 givnesqai ktl. is used to describe the realisation of the ajgaqav (e[nia tw'n ajgaqw'n genovmena). The noun is used to describe obtained or received potentialities or capabilities, such as wisdom, and even emotions, such as carav. In Lucian’s dialogue, in addition to gnwvmh, pisti" (cf Heb 2,17) is also v reckoned among the ajgaqav. If we apply this understanding of ajgaqav to the syntagm of Heb 9,11, one can consider rendering the genitive attribute tw'n genomenwn agaqwn in such a way that it designates the realised or completed v j ' habits or qualities of the high priest, thereby intratextually referring to those expressions that characterise a development of the preexisting Son into a compassionate (Heb 4,15), merciful (Heb 2,17) and obedient (Heb 5,8) Son and high priest. 3. The frame of reference The phrase of Heb 9,11 echoes with its reference to the realised or completed habits or qualities, apart from the reverberation of the teleivwsi"- motif, the motif of education (Heb 5,8; see in addition 12,4-8 where the Christological interpretations related to Christ’s suffering are applied to the suffering of the Church). The author of Hebrews is seemingly a child of his time, for instance in comparison with the educational ideas of Seneca (19). To reach one’s destiny, that is “to live in accordance with his own nature (secundum naturam suam vivere)” (20) we should, according to Seneca, preferably turn our attention to words like these: No man is good by chance. Virtue is something which must be learned (nemo est casu bonus, discenda virtus est) (21). This learning consists, if necessary, of suffering, as Seneca points out at another place: I should prefer to be free from torture; but if the time comes when it must be endured, I shall desire that I may conduct myself therein with (18) My translation. (19) Cf. e.g. A.L. MOTTO, “Seneca on the Perfection of the Soul”, CJ 6 (1956) 275-278. (20) Seneca, Moral Epistles (ed. R.M. GUMMERE) (LCL; Cambridge, MA 1917-1925) I, 277. (21) Seneca, Moral Epistles, III, 435.